Trends in Computational Social Choice

Trends in Computational Social Choice

Author: Ulle Endriss

Publisher: Lulu.com

ISBN: 9781326912093

Category: Computers

Page: 424

View: 455

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Computational social choice is concerned with the design and analysis of methods for collective decision making. It is a research area that is located at the interface of computer science and economics. The central question studied in computational social choice is that of how best to aggregate the individual points of view of several agents, so as to arrive at a reasonable compromise. Examples include tallying the votes cast in an election, aggregating the professional opinions of several experts, and finding a fair manner of dividing a set of resources amongst the members of a group -- Back cover.

Pathways Between Social Science and Computational Social Science

Pathways Between Social Science and Computational Social Science

Author: Tamás Rudas

Publisher: Springer Nature

ISBN: 9783030549367

Category: Social Science

Page: 275

View: 121

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This volume shows that the emergence of computational social science (CSS) is an endogenous response to problems from within the social sciences and not exogeneous. The three parts of the volume address various pathways along which CSS has been developing from and interacting with existing research frameworks. The first part exemplifies how new theoretical models and approaches on which CSS research is based arise from theories of social science. The second part is about methodological advances facilitated by CSS-related techniques. The third part illustrates the contribution of CSS to traditional social science topics, further attesting to the embedded nature of CSS. The expected readership of the volume includes researchers with a traditional social science background who wish to approach CSS, experts in CSS looking for substantive links to more traditional social science theories, methods and topics, and finally, students working in both fields.

The Future of Economic Design

The Future of Economic Design

Author: Jean-François Laslier

Publisher: Springer Nature

ISBN: 9783030180508

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 539

View: 172

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This collection of essays represents responses by over eighty scholars to an unusual request: give your high level assessment of the field of economic design, as broadly construed. Where do we come from? Where do we go from here? The book editors invited short, informal reflections expressing deeply felt but hard to demonstrate opinions, unsupported speculation, and controversial views of a kind one might not normally risk submitting for review. The contributors – both senior researchers who have shaped the field and promising, younger researchers – responded with a diverse collection of provocative pieces, including: retrospective assessments or surveys of the field; opinion papers; reflections on critical points for the development of the discipline; proposals for the immediate future; "science fiction"; and many more. The readers should have fun reading these unusual pieces – as much as the contributors enjoyed writing them.

Computing and Software Science

Computing and Software Science

Author: Bernhard Steffen

Publisher: Springer Nature

ISBN: 9783319919089

Category: Computers

Page: 590

View: 195

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The papers of this volume focus on the foundational aspects of computer science, the thematic origin and stronghold of LNCS, under the title “Computing and Software Science: State of the Art and Perspectives”. They are organized in two parts: The first part, Computation and Complexity, presents a collection of expository papers on fashionable themes in algorithmics, optimization, and complexity. The second part, Methods, Languages and Tools for Future System Development, aims at sketching the methodological evolution that helps guaranteeing that future systems meet their increasingly critical requirements. Chapter 3 is available open access under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License via link.springer.com.

Linking Neutrosophic AHP and Neutrosophic Social Choice Theory for Group Decision Making

Linking Neutrosophic AHP and Neutrosophic Social Choice Theory for Group Decision Making

Author: Sharon Dinarza Álvarez Gómez

Publisher: Infinite Study

ISBN:

Category: Mathematics

Page: 10

View: 287

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Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a decision-making technique that has been widely studied and developed by the scientific community. The interest in this tool is because it combines scientific rigor with the simplicity of its application. Additionally, it has been extended to uncertainty frameworks, such as fuzzy and neutrosophic frameworks. This paper aims to define a new method called NAHP+NSC, where the Neutrosophic Analytic Hierarchy Process (NAHP) is combined with the recently introduced Neutrosophic Social Choice (NSC) theory. Neutrosophy incorporates indeterminacy to both the AHP technique and the SC theory, which is an intrinsic condition of any decision-making process. On the other hand, it is possible to count on a group of experts to carry out the NAHP evaluations, where the chosen alternative is the one with the highest votes. Experts are divided into kind of homogeneous sub-groups called Interest Groups (IG), where each IG conjointly evaluates the proposed alternatives, and then tools of NSC are used for choosing the best alternative. The contribution of this new method is that evaluations and results are more accurate when indeterminacy is incorporated.

ECAI 2020

ECAI 2020

Author: G. De Giacomo

Publisher: IOS Press

ISBN: 9781643681016

Category: Computers

Page: 3122

View: 836

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This book presents the proceedings of the 24th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 2020), held in Santiago de Compostela, Spain, from 29 August to 8 September 2020. The conference was postponed from June, and much of it conducted online due to the COVID-19 restrictions. The conference is one of the principal occasions for researchers and practitioners of AI to meet and discuss the latest trends and challenges in all fields of AI and to demonstrate innovative applications and uses of advanced AI technology. The book also includes the proceedings of the 10th Conference on Prestigious Applications of Artificial Intelligence (PAIS 2020) held at the same time. A record number of more than 1,700 submissions was received for ECAI 2020, of which 1,443 were reviewed. Of these, 361 full-papers and 36 highlight papers were accepted (an acceptance rate of 25% for full-papers and 45% for highlight papers). The book is divided into three sections: ECAI full papers; ECAI highlight papers; and PAIS papers. The topics of these papers cover all aspects of AI, including Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems; Computational Intelligence; Constraints and Satisfiability; Games and Virtual Environments; Heuristic Search; Human Aspects in AI; Information Retrieval and Filtering; Knowledge Representation and Reasoning; Machine Learning; Multidisciplinary Topics and Applications; Natural Language Processing; Planning and Scheduling; Robotics; Safe, Explainable, and Trustworthy AI; Semantic Technologies; Uncertainty in AI; and Vision. The book will be of interest to all those whose work involves the use of AI technology.

Algorithmic aspects of resource allocation and multiwinner voting: theory and experiments

Algorithmic aspects of resource allocation and multiwinner voting: theory and experiments

Author: Kaczmarczyk, Andrzej

Publisher: Universitätsverlag der TU Berlin

ISBN: 9783798332157

Category: Computers

Page: 248

View: 944

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This thesis is concerned with investigating elements of computational social choice in the light of real-world applications. We contribute to a better understanding of the areas of fair allocation and multiwinner voting. For both areas, inspired by real-world scenarios, we propose several new notions and extensions of existing models. Then, we analyze the complexity of answering the computational questions raised by the introduced concepts. To this end, we look through the lens of parameterized complexity. We identify different parameters which describe natural features specific to the computational problems we investigate. Exploiting the parameters, we successfully develop efficient algorithms for spe- cific cases of the studied problems. We complement our analysis by showing which parameters presumably cannot be utilized for seeking efficient algorithms. Thereby, we provide comprehensive pictures of the computational complexity of the studied problems. Specifically, we concentrate on four topics that we present below, grouped by our two areas of interest. For all but one topic, we present experimental studies based on implementations of newly developed algorithms. We first focus on fair allocation of indivisible resources. In this setting, we consider a collection of indivisible resources and a group of agents. Each agent reports its utility evaluation of every resource and the task is to “fairly” allocate the resources such that each resource is allocated to at most one agent. We concentrate on the two following issues regarding this scenario. The social context in fair allocation of indivisible resources. In many fair allocation settings, it is unlikely that every agent knows all other agents. For example, consider a scenario where the agents represent employees of a large corporation. It is highly unlikely that every employee knows every other employee. Motivated by such settings, we come up with a new model of graph envy-freeness by adapting the classical envy-freeness notion to account for social relations of agents modeled as social networks. We show that if the given social network of agents is simple (for example, if it is a directed acyclic graph), then indeed we can sometimes find fair allocations efficiently. However, we contrast tractability results with showing NP-hardness for several cases, including those in which the given social network has a constant degree. Fair allocations among few agents with bounded rationality. Bounded rationality is the idea that humans, due to cognitive limitations, tend to simplify problems that they face. One of its emanations is that human agents usually tend to report simple utilities over the resources that they want to allocate; for example, agents may categorize the available resources only into two groups of desirable and undesirable ones. Applying techniques for solving integer linear programs, we show that exploiting bounded rationality leads to efficient algorithms for finding envy-free and Pareto-efficient allocations, assuming a small number of agents. Further, we demonstrate that our result actually forms a framework that can be applied to a number of different fairness concepts like envy-freeness up to one good or envy-freeness up to any good. This way, we obtain efficient algorithms for a number of fair allocation problems (assuming few agents with bounded rationality). We also empirically show that our technique is applicable in practice. Further, we study multiwinner voting, where we are given a collection of voters and their preferences over a set of candidates. The outcome of a multiwinner voting rule is a group (or a set of groups in case of ties) of candidates that reflect the voters’ preferences best according to some objective. In this context, we investigate the following themes. The robustness of election outcomes. We study how robust outcomes of multiwinner elections are against possible mistakes made by voters. Assuming that each voter casts a ballot in a form of a ranking of candidates, we represent a mistake by a swap of adjacent candidates in a ballot. We find that for rules such as SNTV, k-Approval, and k-Borda, it is computationally easy to find the minimum number of swaps resulting in a change of an outcome. This task is, however, NP-hard for STV and the Chamberlin-Courant rule. We conclude our study of robustness with experimentally studying the average number of random swaps leading to a change of an outcome for several rules. Strategic voting in multiwinner elections. We ask whether a given group of cooperating voters can manipulate an election outcome in a favorable way. We focus on the k-Approval voting rule and we show that the computational complexity of answering the posed question has a rich structure. We spot several cases for which our problem is polynomial-time solvable. However, we also identify NP-hard cases. For several of them, we show how to circumvent the hardness by fixed-parameter tractability. We also present experimental studies indicating that our algorithms are applicable in practice. Diese Arbeit befasst sich mit der Untersuchung von Themen des Forschungsgebiets Computational Social Choice im Lichte realer Anwendungen. Dabei trägt sie zu einem besseren Verständnis der Bereiche der fairen Zuordnung und der Mehrgewinnerwahlen bei. Für beide Konzepte schlagen wir – inspiriert von realen Anwendungen – verschiedene neue Begriffe und Erweiterungen bestehender Modelle vor. Anschließend analysieren wir die Komplexität der Beantwortung von Berechnungsfragen, die durch die eingeführten Konzepte aufgeworfen werden. Dabei fokussieren wir uns auf die parametrisierte Komplexität. Hierzu identifizieren wir verschiedene Parameter, welche natürliche Merkmale der von uns untersuchten Berechnungsprobleme beschreiben. Durch die Nutzung dieser Parameter entwickeln wir erfolgreich effiziente Algorithmen für Spezialfälle der untersuchten Probleme. Wir ergänzen unsere Analyse indem wir zeigen, welche Parameter vermutlich nicht verwendet werden können um effiziente Algorithmen zu finden. Dabei zeichnen wir ein umfassendes Bild der Berechnungskomplexität der untersuchten Probleme. Insbesondere konzentrieren wir uns auf vier Themen, die wir, gruppiert nach unseren beiden Schwerpunkten, unten vorstellen. Für alle Themen bis auf eines präsentieren wir Experimente, die auf Implementierungen der von uns neu entwickelten Algorithmen basieren. Wir konzentrieren uns zunächst auf die faire Zuordnung unteilbarer Ressourcen. Hier betrachten wir eine Menge unteilbarer Ressourcen und eine Gruppe von Agenten. Jeder Agent gibt eine Bewertung des Nutzens jeder Ressource ab und die Aufgabe besteht darin, eine "faire" Zuordnung der Ressourcen zu finden, wobei jede Ressource höchstens einem Agenten zugeordnet werden kann. Innerhalb dieses Bereiches konzentrieren wir uns auf die beiden folgenden Problemstellungen. Der soziale Kontext bei der fairen Zuordnung unteilbarer Ressourcen. In vielen Szenarien, in denen Ressourcen zugeordnet werden sollen, ist es unwahrscheinlich, dass jeder Agent alle anderen kennt. Vorstellbar ist beispielsweise ein Szenario, in dem die Agenten Mitarbeiter eines großen Unternehmens repräsentieren. Es ist höchst unwahrscheinlich, dass jeder Mitarbeiter jeden anderen Mitarbeiter kennt. Motiviert durch solche Szenarien entwickeln wir ein neues Modell der graph-basierten Neidfreiheit. Wir erweitern den klassischen Neidfreiheitsbegriff um die sozialen Beziehungen von Agenten, die durch soziale Netzwerke modelliert werden. Einerseits zeigen wir, dass wenn das soziale Netzwerk der Agenten einfach ist (zum Beispiel, wenn es sich um einen gerichteten azyklischen Graph handelt), in manchen Fällen faire Zuordnungen effizient gefunden werden können. Andererseits stellen wir diesen algorithmisch positiven Ergebnissen mehrere NP-schweren Fällen entgegen. Ein Beispiel für einen solchen Fall sind soziale Netzwerke mit einem konstanten Knotengrad. Faire Zuteilung an wenige Agenten mit begrenzter Rationalität. Begrenzte Rationalität beschreibt die Idee, dass Menschen aufgrund kognitiver Grenzen dazu neigen, Probleme, mit denen sie konfrontiert werden, zu vereinfachen. Eine mögliche Folge dieser Grenzen ist, dass menschliche Agenten in der Regel einfache Bewertungen der gewünschten Ressourcen abgeben; beispielsweise könnten Agenten die verfügbaren Ressourcen nur in zwei Gruppen, erwünschte und unerwünschte Ressourcen, kategorisieren. Durch Anwendung von Techniken zum Lösen von Ganzzahligen Linearen Programmen zeigen wir, dass unter der Annahme einer kleinen Anzahl von Agenten die Ausnutzung begrenzter Rationalität dabei hilft, effiziente Algorithmen zum Finden neidfreier und Pareto-effizienter Zuweisungen zu entwickeln. Weiterhin zeigen wir, dass unser Ergebnis ein allgemeines Verfahren liefert, welches auf eine Reihe verschiedener Fairnesskonzepte angewendet werden kann, wie zum Beispiel Neidfreiheit bis auf ein Gut oder Neidfreiheit bis auf irgendein Gut. Auf diese Weise gewinnen wir effiziente Algorithmen für eine Reihe fairer Zuordnungsprobleme (wenige Agenten mit begrenzter Rationalität vorausgesetzt). Darüber hinaus zeigen wir empirisch, dass unsere Technik in der Praxis anwendbar ist. Weiterhin untersuchen wir Mehrgewinnerwahlen, bei denen uns eine Menge von Wählern sowie ihre Präferenzen über eine Reihe von Kandidaten gegeben sind. Das Ergebnis eines Mehrgewinnerwahlverfahrens ist eine Gruppe (oder eine Menge von Gruppen im Falle eines Unentschiedens) von Kandidaten, welche die Präferenzen der Wähler am besten einem bestimmten Ziel folgend widerspiegeln. In diesem Kontext untersuchen wir die folgenden Themen. Die Robustheit von Wahlergebnissen. Wir untersuchen, wie robust die Ergebnisse von Mehrgewinnerwahlen gegenüber möglicher Fehler der Wähler sind. Unter der Annahme, dass jeder Wähler eine Stimme in Form einer Rangliste von Kandidaten abgibt, modellieren wir einen Fehler als einen Tausch benachbarter Kandidaten in der Rangliste. Wir zeigen, dass für Wahlregeln wie SNTV, k-Approval und k-Borda die minimale Anzahl an Vertauschungen, welche zu einer Ergebnisänderung führt, einfach zu berechnen ist. Für STV und die Chamberlin-Courant-Regel ist diese Aufgabe allerdings NP-schwer. Wir schließen unsere Untersuchung der Robustheit unterschiedlicher Wahlregeln ab mit einer experimentellen Evaluierung der durchschnittlichen Anzahl zufälliger Vertauschungen, die zu einer Änderung des Ergebnisses führen. Strategische Abstimmung bei Wahlen mit mehreren Gewinnern. Wir fragen, ob eine bestimmte Gruppe von kooperierenden Wählern ein Wahlergebnis zu ihren Gunsten manipulieren kann. Dabei konzentrieren wir uns auf die k-Approval-Wahlregel. Wir zeigen, dass die Berechnungskomplexität der besagten Manipulation eine reiche Struktur besitzt. Auf der einen Seite identifizieren wir mehrere Fälle in denen das Problem in Polynomzeit lösbar ist. Auf der anderen Seite identifizieren wir jedoch auch NP-schwere Fälle. Für einige von ihnen zeigen wir, wie die Berechnungsschwere durch parametrisierte Algorithmen umgangen werden kann. Wir präsentieren zudem experimentelle Untersuchungen, welche darauf hindeuten, dass unsere Algorithmen in der Praxis anwendbar sind.

AI 2021

AI 2021

Author: Guodong Long

Publisher: Springer Nature

ISBN: 9783030975463

Category: Application software

Page: 810

View: 263

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This book constitutes the proceedings of the 34th Australasian Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, AI 2021, held in Sydney, NSW, Australia, in February 2022.* The 64 full papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 120 submissions. The papers were organized in topical sections named: Ethical AI, Applications, Classical AI, Computer Vision and Machine Learning, Natural Language Processing and Data Mining, and Network Analysis. *The conference was postponed from December 2021 to February 2022 and held virtually due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Multi-winner Voting with Approval Preferences

Multi-winner Voting with Approval Preferences

Author: Martin Lackner

Publisher: Springer Nature

ISBN: 9783031090165

Category: Preferential ballot

Page: 127

View: 374

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From fundamental concepts and results to recent advances in computational social choice, this open access book provides a thorough and in-depth look at multi-winner voting based on approval preferences. The main focus is on axiomatic analysis, algorithmic results and several applications that are relevant in artificial intelligence, computer science and elections of any kind. What is the best way to select a set of candidates for a shortlist, for an executive committee, or for product recommendations? Multi-winner voting is the process of selecting a fixed-size set of candidates based on the preferences expressed by the voters. A wide variety of decision processes in settings ranging from politics (parliamentary elections) to the design of modern computer applications (collaborative filtering, dynamic Q&A platforms, diversity in search results, etc.) share the problem of identifying a representative subset of alternatives. The study of multi-winner voting provides the principled analysis of this task. Approval-based committee voting rules (in short: ABC rules) are multi-winner voting rules particularly suitable for practical use. Their usability is founded on the straightforward form in which the voters can express preferences: voters simply have to differentiate between approved and disapproved candidates. Proposals for ABC rules are numerous, some dating back to the late 19th century while others have been introduced only very recently. This book explains and discusses these rules, highlighting their individual strengths and weaknesses. With the help of this book, the reader will be able to choose a suitable ABC voting rule in a principled fashion, participate in, and be up to date with the ongoing research on this topic.

Multi-Agent Systems

Multi-Agent Systems

Author: Dorothea Baumeister

Publisher: Springer Nature

ISBN: 9783031206146

Category: Computers

Page: 462

View: 112

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This book constitutes thoroughly refereed and revised selected papers from the proceedings of 19th European Conference on Multi-Agent Systems, EUMAS 2022, held in Düsseldorf, Germany, during September 14–16, 2022. The 23 full papers included in this book were carefully reviewed and selected from 36 submissions. The book also contains 6 short summaries of talks from PhD students at the PhD day. The papers deal with current topics in the research and development of multi-agent systems.

Logics in Artificial Intelligence

Logics in Artificial Intelligence

Author: Francesco Calimeri

Publisher: Springer

ISBN: 9783030195700

Category: Computers

Page: 822

View: 732

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This book constitutes the proceedings of the 16th European Conference on Logics in Artificial Intelligence, JELIA 2019, held in Rende, Italy, in May 2019. The 50 full papers and 10 short papers included in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 101 submissions. Additionally, the book contains 3 invited papers. The accepted papers span a number of areas within Logics in AI, including: belief revision and argumentation; causal, defeasible and inductive reasoning; conditional, probabilistic and propositional logic; description logics; logic programming; modal and default logic; and temporal logic.

Algorithmic Game Theory

Algorithmic Game Theory

Author: Panagiotis Kanellopoulos

Publisher: Springer Nature

ISBN: 9783031157141

Category: Computers

Page: 596

View: 387

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This book constitutes the proceedings of the 15th International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory, SAGT 2022, which took place in Colchester, UK, in September 2022. The 31 full papers included in this book were carefully reviewed and selected from 83 submissions. They were organized in topical sections as follows: Auctions, markets and mechanism design; computational aspects in games; congestion and network creation games; data sharing and learning; social choice and stable matchings.